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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

3.5(c) GAO

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO
IAD/TG 3.5(c)		DATE 21 December 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, IAD/TG				3.5(c)
2. 3.5(c)				
3. Assistant Legislature Counsel				
4.				
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3603/1

21 December 1978

3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Assistant Legislative Counsel

FROM: [redacted] 3.5(c)
IAD/TG

SUBJECT: GAO Draft Report on Terrorism

1. Our initial look at GAO's draft report indicates several areas concerning intelligence collection activity in which we believe the writers to be misinformed. For example, the points made on pages vi, 63, and 74 concerning constraints on collection on foreign domestic terrorist groups are clearly misleading. Part of this is the result of GAO's confusing of "covert operations," and their special requirements, with collection activity. Another such example is the comment on page 72 on differences in CIA and Defense collection. CIA's requirements procedure is indeed different, given our unique clandestine collection programs, but it is no less valid (or "formal") than DIA's.

3.5(c)

2. NFAC/ORPA/IID [redacted] has been in touch with us and dropped off his annotated copy of the study. He indicated his office has a number of problems with the study, and certainly the NFAC copy is replete with questioning notes.

3. Also of special note, the subject of a coordinated Executive Branch response was raised by the Department of Defense member at the 12 December session of the NSC/SCC Executive Committee on Terrorism. The Chairman, Ambassador Tony Quainton, has agreed to address this following the holidays. We understand that DOD, State, and others will probably postpone their response to the GAO until after that get-together.

3.5(c)

4. In sum, both IAD/TG and NFAC/ORPA have problems with the paper which we would like to discuss with the GAO

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[redacted]

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SUBJECT: (Optional) 3.5(c)

GAO

FROM: [redacted] IAD/TG

EXTENSION [redacted] NO. OLC #78-3603/1 3.5(c)

DATE 21 December 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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2. 3.5(c)				
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[redacted]

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DRAFT OF A

PROPOSED REPORT

WHAT'S BEING DONE TO PROTECT THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM?

NOTICE--THIS DRAFT RESTRICTED TO OFFICIAL USE

This document is a *draft* of a proposed report of the General Accounting Office. It was prepared by GAO's staff as a basis for obtaining advance review and comment by those having responsibilities concerning the subjects discussed in the draft. It has *not* been fully reviewed within GAO and is, therefore, subject to revision.

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PREPARED
BY THE STAFF
OF THE
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

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ID-79-3

GAO Form 515 (1/77)
Replaces GAO Forms 331, 332, and 333

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DRAFT

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ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCM	Deputy Chief of Missions
GAO	General Accounting Office

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

WHAT'S BEING DONE TO PROTECT THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM?

D I G E S T

In recent years, increased terrorism has become the focus of world attention. Although extensive publicity has been given to individual terrorist incidents during the last decade, there has been a slight decline in the number of kidnapping-hostage situations or bombings against the U.S. diplomatic community.

GAO reviewed terrorist attacks on American diplomats serving abroad. The study includes analyses of terrorism and counter-terrorist programs in Germany, Italy, Greece Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

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The decline in attacks against U.S. targets may be attributed to:

--Improved law enforcement capabilities by countries that have experienced substantial levels of violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

--Improved security measures adopted by U.S. Embassies and consulate posts.

--The absence of the Vietnam War issue, which helped the terrorists to gain popular support.

--Host-government adoption of hard-line, no negotiation, no concession policies for kidnapping and hostage incidents.

Current groups that carry out acts of international terrorism fall into three broad categories.

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1. Ethnic separatist or refugee groups, dedicated to achieving and protecting greater local automony or total independence or to recovering lost homelands. These groups have been responsible for assaults, bombings, and barricade incidents against their declared enemies.

2. Revolutionary groups, dedicated to bringing about fundamental political, social, and economic change in their own countries. These groups particularly in South America, are responsible for the majority of kidnappings of American diplomats.

3. Transnational terrorist groups, whose political concepts transcend national borders. These groups include the Palestinians and the Japanese Red Army, which are responsible for incidents against American diplomats in Sudan, Jordan, and Malaysia.

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HARD-LINE AND SOFT-LINE POLICIES

Few governments have specific hard-line, no-concession policies. Analyses of various incidents shows that government reaction to an incident largely depends on the circumstances surrounding the incident. More governments have adopted hard-line policies toward negotiating with domestic revolutionary groups than toward the transnational terrorists. Italy, Colombia, Germany, Argentina, and Mexico have at one time or another refused to negotiate with domestic terrorists and the kidnap victims were eventually murdered. On the other hand, governments which have been faced with Palestinian or Japanese Red Army terrorists are inclined to bargain, allowing the terrorists to achieve their operational objectives or to leave the country.

The United States has a stated no-ransom, no negotiation policy toward terrorists. However, demands are rarely placed on the United States, and so this policy is rarely

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critical in terrorist incidents involving American diplomats.

CAPABILITIES OF HOST GOVERNMENTS

A number of countries covered * in GAO's review do not have the capacity to control terrorism because of poor law enforcement capabilities. Many countries lack adequate manpower, training, equipment, and intelligence coordination to combat terrorism. Countries that have experienced some degree of success have done so at a tremendous cost in civil liberties, particularly in South America and Asia.

LIMITED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION



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The intelligence that has been received by the various agencies having collection and reporting requirements is apparently being freely shared among U.S. agencies. Also, cooperation and sharing of intelligence during and after major incidents is generally excellent.

ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES

Over the last few years, the United States has upgraded physical security at many of its overseas missions. The effect of the security measures is difficult to measure, but they have reduced the vulnerability of these missions to attacks and improved the protection provided to Ambassadors and other high-level officials. Nevertheless, most members of the U.S. diplomatic corps remain highly vulnerable to personal attack and some Embassies and consulate posts have not attained minimum security standards.

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One Officer kidnapped and one slain
in Cordoba, Argentina, in 1974 and 1975

Alfred A. Laun III, chief of the United States Information Service in Cordoba was kidnapped on April 12, 1974, by a terrorist probably belonging to the People's Revolutionary Army. Laun, who had been beaten and shot by his abductors, was released 15 hours later when the seriousness of his wounds became evident.

U.S. consular agent John Patrick Egan was kidnapped on February 26, 1975, by a group of armed men who reportedly were members of the left wing Montoneros guerrilla organization; 48 hours later, when their demands to present safe and sound four imprisoned Montoneros were not met, they murdered Egan.

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Argentina

By early 1976, the intensity of political violence in Argentina had come near that thin line which separates terrorist violence from civil war. The two major urban guerrilla groups, the Peoples Revolutionary Army and the Montoneros, each had an estimated 2,500 combatants, and had each attracted the active support of some of some 12,000 sympathizers. Both groups had demonstrated a high degree of coordination in kidnapping business executives and making commando raids on small towns and military garrisons.

The most serious effort to combat the terrorists was probably the establishment of the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, organized by the social welfare minister in August 1974. The Alliance engaged in the liquidation

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of leftists with the tacit concurrence of the police. The army also was given a major role in the counter-terrorist campaign and conducted sweeps against the terrorists in the provinces.

By mid-1977, the combined military and police counter-terrorists forces had effectively crippled the two guerrilla groups, neutralizing their former capabilities to carry out large-scale military terrorist operations. In late 1977 [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] the military war against the subversives was rapidly coming to an end and that 1978 terrorist activity should be limited to action on the labor, student, and religious fronts. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1) 3.5(c)

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Argentina has adopted some of the most stringent procedures to deal with political subversion. In June 1976, Argentina's military government ordered death by firing squad or life imprisonment for anyone found guilty of killing a government official or a member of the security forces. Persons sentenced to death would be shot within

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48 hours of sentencing. The new penal code also authorized perpetual deprivation of all civil and political rights for anyone convicted of subversion. Irritated with the lengthy and often unsuccessful attempts to prosecute the terrorists through civil courts, the government decreed in November 1976, that the administration of justice to "subversives" would be handled entirely by the armed forces, from the collection of evidence to prosecution and sentencing by special military tribunals.

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

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

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